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I. INTRODUCTION
Our present Article 3, found deep within Chapter 25 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, was formed from the fabric of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). Promulgated in
1896 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and adopted in all states by 1924, the NIL
was based on the developed case law at that time in America and
the English Bills of Exchange Act which was enacted by Parlia-
ment in 1882.1
Although the NIL was extraordinarily successful as a uniform
law, it and other contemporaneous uniform laws began to show a
need for revision as early as the late 1930's.2 By the 1940's, the
NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALI) were working to-
gether to revise and modernize the NIL and the other areas of
commercial law that would together emerge in the 1950's as the
* Professor of Law Campbell University Norman Adrian Wiggins School of
Law. B.A., J.D. Washington and Lee University.
1. J. BRADY, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT iv (1932).
2. See J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 3 (3d ed.
1988); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L.
REv. 367 (1957); See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-101 Official Comment (1986).
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Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).3
The revised NIL became Article 3 of the UCC. Entitled "Com-
mercial Paper," it has been a part of the North Carolina General
Statutes since its adoption in 1965 along with the other articles,
one through eleven, making up North Carolina's present UCC.
4
During the twenty-six years of its existence in North Carolina,
Article 3 has not been litigated extensively. Indeed, judging by the
annotations in the General Statutes, the majority of negotiable in-
strument cases have been decided under the NIL and not under
Article 3. Such little litigation should perhaps be expected from an
area of the law that for years has been considered fairly well set-
tled, as indicated by its early codification as the NIL and adoption
by all states and its subsequent revision and adoption by all states
as Article 3 of the UCC.
The small amount of litigation on Article 3 in North Carolina
does not, however, mean that no problems have surfaced in Article
3 on a national level. or that the passage of time, with its changing
commercial practices and technologies, has not affected Article 3.
In explaining the need for a revision of Article 3, the NCCUSL and
the ALI state that the basic reason for a revision is the accumula-
tion of decisions based upon Article 3.6 Some of these decisions,
they assert, have identified problems which now need to be cor-
rected in statutory language.' Also, they point out that banks and
other institutions, primarily as a result of new technology, operate
differently than they did when the UCC was first promulgated,
particularly with regard to processing checks. 7 In addition, they
add that changing business practices, such as allowing savings and
loans, credit unions and other brokerage houses to offer accounts
upon which checks and other payment orders can be drawn, also
call for Article 3 to address those changes.8 Finally, they cite the
need to rid Article 3 of unnecessary technical and archaic language,
3. The first "Official Text" appeared in 1952.
4. With the adoption of changes in Article 8 and Article 9 required by the
General Assembly's recent passage of the Business Corporation Act, North Caro-
lina now has the 1977 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. See "Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments - A
Summary" and "Why States Should Adopt Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC," in information package distributed by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
6. See supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. See "Why States Should Adopt Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC," in
information package distributed by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
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REVISED ARTICLE 3
to reorganize the material in a more logical sequence, and to re-
solve areas of current non-uniformity among the states." In short,
it is asserted that Article 3 has aged like its predecessor, the NIL,
and is now in need of revision and modernization.
As a result, the NCCUSL and the ALI began work on a revi-
sion and modernization of Article 3 several years ago and in 1990
finished work on a proposed revised Article 3.11 The time has now
come for the states to examine the revised article for possible
adoption.
Although any complete consideration of Article 3 for adoption
will no doubt include an examination of the revised Article 4,11 this
article will concentrate only on revised Article 3, which of the two
revised articles is more extensively revised. 12 In addition, this arti-
cle is not intended to be a detailed examination of the revised Arti-
cle 3. Since the revised Article 3 completely replaces the present
Article 3, a detailed examination of revised Article 3 must focus on
each section of the revised article in the light of its predecessor
section in the present article, as well as examine those sections
which the revised article has omitted and those which it has added.
To complete such an examination would take far more time than is
available with this article's deadline and more space than the LAW
REVIEW can reasonably provide for this one article
As its title suggests, this article is intended merely as a pre-
view of revised Article 3. It will begin with some overall comments
about revised Article 3, specifically about the extent and signifi-
cance of the revision. It then will discuss specific examples from
revised Article 3 to illustrate how the revision affects present Arti-
cle 3 and how it furthers the goals of the NCCUSL and the ALI. It
will also include references to present North Carolina case law or
statutory law that may be affected by the revision. If this preview
9. See supra note 8.
10. For a short history of the revision of Articles 3 and 4, as well as the ill-
fated Uniform New Payments Code, see Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Pro-
posed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 43 Bus. LAW. 621, 621-623 (1988).
11. A revised Article 4 was also proposed by the NCCUSL and the ALI in
1990. Both present Article 4 and revised Article 4 are entitled "Bank Deposits
and Collections." ,
12. See "Conforming and Miscellaneous Amendments to Uniform Commer-
cial Code Article 4" in the NCCUSL and the ALI's information packet. It ex-
plains that a full revision of Article 4 was delayed because of the Federal Reserve
Board's announcement in 1990 that it was contemplating the assumption of regu-
latory control over forward collection of checks and that it might also extend
other regulatory controls over bank deposits and collections.
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conveys to the BAR at least a taste of what the revision of Article
3 is about, the purpose of this article will be fulfilled.
II. THE REVISION IN GENERAL
The easiest assessment to make about revised Article 3 is that
it is a complete and thorough revision. If one perhaps hoped that
the NCCUSL and the ALI would merely take present Article 3 and
make changes here and there in its now familiar code sections, cur-
sory glance at the language of revised Article 3 will dash that hope.
What is being proposed is not an amended version of the present
Article 3 as the NCCUSL and the ALI did with the 1972 version of
Article 9,13 but a completely revised Article 3. The familiar sections
of present Article 3 are completely rewritten, leaving only bits and
pieces of the original language. Although the familiar numbering
system is retained, that is, the 3-100's through 3-600's,14 the sec-
tion numbers in the revised article do not necessarily correspond to
the section numbers of the same or similar sections in present Arti-
cle 3. Indeed, the subsections in any one section of present Article
3 may have been scattered into several different revised Article 3
sections, and the subsections from several different present Article
3 sections may have been combined into one revised Article 3 sec-
tion. In fact, so many sections of present Article 3 have been either
omitted or changed to a completely different numbered section
that revised Article 3 comes with a "Table of Disposition of Sec-
tions in Former [i.e., the present] Article 3," (Table of Disposition)
so that one can more easily figure out what has happened to a spe-
cific section in present Article 3. However, although the seven part
organization of the sections in present Article 316 is reduced to five
parts in revised Article 3,11 those five parts which remain in the
13. The 1972 version of Article 9 of the UCC, adopted in North Carolina in
1975, took this path, that is, amending the provisions of the 1962 Code with addi-
tional language here and less language there, without any major rewriting of Arti-
cle 9's provisions.
14. The § 3-700's, concerning advice of international sight drafts, and the §
3-800's, on miscellaneous matters, are both eliminated in revised Article 3.
15. Part 1, Short Title, Form and Interpretation; Part 2, Transfer and Nego-
tiation; Part 3, Rights of a Holder; Part 4, Liability of Parties; Part 5, Present-
ment, Notice of Dishonor and Protest; Part 6, Discharge; Part 7, Advice of Inter-
national Sight Draft; Part 8, Miscellaneous.
16. Part 1, General Provisions and Definitions; Part 2, Negotiation, Transfer,
and Indorsement; Part 3, Enforcement of Instruments; Part 4, Liability of Par-
ties; Part 5, Dishonor; Part 6, Discharge and Payment.
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REVISED ARTICLE 3
revised article are essentially the same as the original five parts
which they replace.
The Official Comments to present Article 3 are, of course,
gone, but, fortunately, they are replaced in revised Article 3 by
fairly extensive and generally quite helpful new Official Comments
which frequently give examples for illustrative purposes and refer-
ences to prior statutory provisions in present Article 3. The Official
Comments in revised Article 3, however, do not contain the very
helpful and convenient sections setting out prior uniform statutory
provisions, cross references, and definitional cross references, all of
which are contained in the Official Comments of present Article 3.
Such general comments about Article 3's revision can do little
in conveying its actual extent and significance. To get a better
grasp on the revision of Article 3, assume that a lawyer represents
the payee of a check which has been dishonored by the drawee
bank because of insufficient funds. Once the decision has been
made to sue the drawer of the check, the lawyer might check the
present applicable law by looking at N.C. GEN. STAT.+ § 25-3-413,
entitled "Contract of maker, drawer and acceptor" and located in
present Article 3's Part 4, which is aptly labeled, "Liability of the
Parties." Subsection (2) of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413 sets out the
contract of a drawer on a check as follows: "The drawer engages
that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dis-
honor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder
or to any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim this
liability by drawing without recourse"."
Under present Article 3, the drawer's contract is a contract of
secondary liability18 because the drawer need pay only after dis-
honor ' 9 and after any necessary notice of dishonor 0 or protest2"
has been given. Indeed, the lawyer should probably check to be
certain that dishonor has indeed occurred and that any necessary
notice of dishonor or protest has been given because of the possi-
bility of discharge resulting from an untimely presentment or an
untimely notice of dishonor or protest.22
Under revised Article 3, the lawyer who knows about N.C.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413 (1986).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-102(d) (1986) defines a "secondary party" as a
drawer or endorser.
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-3-501(1)(c) and 25-3-507(1) (1986).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-501(2)(b) (1986).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-501(3) (1986).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-502 (1)(b) and (2) (1986).
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GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2) in present Article 3 cannot assume that
the section number 3-413 will take him to the comparable section
in revised Article 3. Indeed, revised section 3-413 is entitled "Obli-
gation of Acceptor" and relates to the acceptor's contract presently
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(1), but it has nothing to do
with the drawer's contract. In this case, the lawyer must consult
the Table of Disposition which shows that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
413(2) is now found in revised subsections 3-414(b) and (e). 23
Revised section 3-414 is indeed labeled, "Obligation of
Drawer," which seems applicable to the drawer's contract, but it
appears quite extensive when compared to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
314(2). In contrast with the two sentences of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-
3-314(2), revised section 3-414 has six separate subsections!
A quick reading of revised subsection 3-414(e) reveals that it
relates to the second sentence of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-314(2)
concerning drawing without recourse. Therefore, the lawyer will
conclude that revised subsection 3-414(b) and not (e) must relate
to the drawer's contract set out in the first sentence of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-413(2).
The language of revised subsection 3-414(b), however, has lit-
tle resemblance to the first sentence of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
413(2). It provides as follows:
If an unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is obliged to pay
the draft (i) according to its terms at the time it was issued or, if
not issued, at the time it first came into possession of a holder, or
(ii) if the drawer signed an incomplete instrument, according to
its terms when completed, to the extent stated in Sections 3-115
and 3-407. The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce
the draft or to an indorser who paid the draft under Section 3-
415.24
Fortunately, the Official Comment to revised section 3-414 does
confirm that this subsection (b) replaces former subsection 3-
413(2).25
23. The same table shows that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(1) is now in two
different sections, revised section 3-412 for the old maker's contract and revised
subsection 3-413(a) for the acceptor's contract. The table also shows that N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(3), applying to an acceptance that varies the terms of the
draft and the resulting discharge, is omitted. Instead of using the Table of Dispo-
sition, the lawyer could have looked to Part 4 of revised Article 4, entitled "Lia-
bility of Parties," exactly as it is in present Article 4, and then used the headings
of the sections to get to revised section 3-414.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2) (1986).
25. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 2 (1990).
[Vol. 13:259264
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Now that subsection 3-414(b) in revised Article 3 has defi-
nitely been identified as the counterpart of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
314(2), the lawyer must consider the significance of the differences
between the two. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2) uses
the term "draft" while revised subsection 3-414(a) uses the term
"unaccepted draft." Since revised subsection 3-414(b) uses a differ-
ent term, the lawyer must face the question whether that different
term has a different meaning. Hopefully, the lawyer knows that the
draft referred to in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2) has not been ac-
cepted under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-410(1) in the sense that the
drawee bank has not certified it under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
411(1). A quick check of the Table of Disposition will then give
some assurance that the terms are really the same. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-3-410(1) is now under revised Article 3 subsection 3-409(a),
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-411(1) is now revised subsection 3-
409(d). Revised section 3-409 is entitled, "Acceptance of Draft;
Certified Check," and its subsections (a) and (d) readily confirm
that the term "unaccepted draft" of revised Article 3 is indeed the
same as the-"draft" of present Article 3; both apply to the uncerti-
fied, personal check.
Yet another uncertainty appears in revised subsection 3-
414(b). Although there is a reference to dishonor as in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-413(2), any mention of giving notice of dishonor or
protest has disappeared in the revised subsection. Fortunately
again, the Official Comment explains that the former requirement
of giving notice of dishonor or protest has been eliminated.2 6 In-
deed, the comment adds that the liability of the drawer of an un-
accepted draft is now treated as a primary liability rather than a
secondary liability.2
Although revised subsection 3-414(b) and the Official Com-
ment confirm that no notice of dishonor or protest need be given
under revised Article 3, the lawyer must again consider the signifi-
cance of that change. The easy conclusion is that it merely elimi-
nates two steps that the lawyer no longer need worry about or
prove in a suit against the drawer. The Official Comment to re-
vised section 3-503, entitled, "Notice of Dishonor," confirms this
26. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 2 (1990). The comment also states that
notice of dishonor is necessary only with respect to the indorser's liability under
revised Article 3.
27. Id. The comment adds that the term "secondary party" is not used in
revised Article 3.
1991]
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conclusion about notice of dishonor by stating, "They [the draw-
ers] are entitled to have the instrument presented to the drawee
and dishonored. . before they are liable to pay, but no notice of
dishonor need be made to them as a condition of liability. ' 28 The
Official Comment to revised section 3-505, entitled, "Evidence of
Dishonor," confirms the same conclusion about protest by stating,
Protest is no longer mandatory and must be requested by the
holder. Even if requested, protest is not a condition to the liability
of indorsers or drawers.29
Another significance relating to the elimination of notice of
dishonor has to do with discharge resulting from an untimely no-
tice of dishonor. The Official Comment to revised section 3-503
states rather obscurely that ". . .[t]here is no reason why drawers
should be discharged on instruments they draw until payment or
acceptance."30 This reference is certainly made concerning the ef-
fect of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-502(1)(b) which, upon an untimely
notice of dishonor by the holder 3' and loss of funds by the drawer
resulting from drawee bank's insolvency occurring during the delay
in giving notice, allows the drawer to discharge his liability by writ-
ten assignment to the holder of his rights against the drawee bank.
Regardless of the policy decision not to allow the drawer to dis-
charge his liability in such a situation, revised Article 3's elimina-
tion of the requirement of giving notice of dishonor surely elimi-
nates the possibility of any discharge of the drawer as a result of
an untimely notice of dishonor!
Although revised Article 3 eliminates the necessity of giving
notice of dishonor, other North Carolina statutory provisions may
actually bring it back. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.3, enti-
tled "Remedies for returned check," provides that a drawer who
fails to pay a non-sufficient fund check in cash to the payee within
thirty (30) days of "written demand," shall be liable for the
amount of the check and, in addition, for damages of the lesser of
five hundred dollars or three times the amount of the check, but in
no case less than one hundred dollars. Thus, to the extent the at-
torney wants damages, he must essentially give a notice of dis-
honor to the drawer.3 2
28. U.C.C. § 3-503, Official Comment 1 (1990).
29. U.C.C. § 3-505, Official Comment (1990).
30. U.C.C. § 3-503, Official Comment 1 (1990).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-508(2) (1986).
32. N.C. GEN, STAT. § 6-21.3 (1986) sets out exactly what must appear in the
"written demand."
[Vol. 13:259
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A similar type of notice may be desired in a criminal action for
a worthless check under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-107. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14.107.1 describes a procedure for establishing a prima facie case
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-107, and part of that procedure in-
cludes the sending of a letter by certified mail to the check
passer.33 Thus, again, what is essentially a notice of dishonor, may
need to be sent, despite its elimination under revised Article 3.
Another obvious difference between N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
413(2) and revised subsection 3-414(b) has to do with what the
drawer agrees to do. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2), the
drawer agrees to pay "the amount of the draft to the holder or to
any indorser who takes it up." Revised subsection 3-414(b) states
that the drawer will pay the draft in either of two situations,
neither of which seems particularly similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-
3-413(2).
In the first of the two situations under revised subsection 3-
414(b), the drawer agrees to pay the unaccepted draft according to
its terms at the time it is issued or, if not issued, at the time it first
comes into possession of a holder. 34 The word "issue," defined in
present article 3 as "the first delivery of an instrument to a holder
or a remitter, '35 and the phrase "not issued" will certainly raise
some concern in the lawyer's mind. Unlike present Article 3, re-
vised Article 3 does not include as a part of its Official Comments
any definitional cross reference section. Like present Article 3,
however, revised Article 3 does provide in its revised section 3-103
a list of words defined or used in the article, with references to
appropriate sections. In that list is the word "issue" with a refer-
ence to revised section 3-105, entitled "Issue of Instrument."
Revised subsection 3-105(a) defines issue similarly, although
somewhat more broadly than present Article 3. It states that issue
"means the first delivery of an instrument by the maker or drawer,
whether to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights
on the instrument to any person."'36 Revised subsection 3-105(b)
then provides that an unissued instrument, or an unissued incom-
plete instrument that is completed, is binding on the maker or
drawer, but nonissuance is a defense. This subsection 3-105(b) and
its Official Comment then suggest that the reference in revised sec-
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-107.1(b)(5) (1986).
34. U.C.C. § 3-414(b)(i) (1990).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-102(1)(a) (1986).
36. See U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 1 (1990).
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tion 3-414(b) to an instrument "not issued," means an instrument,
either completed or not, which the drawer has not yet delivered,
but which has somehow gotten in the hands of a holder.3 7 Thus,
revised section 3-414(b), in this first situation, seems merely to de-
scribe in considerable detail the amount that a drawer must pay
and does not describe an agreement significantly different from the
drawer's contract of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2).
In the second situation under revised subsection 3-414(a), if
the drawer signs an incomplete instrument, the drawer agrees to
pay the unaccepted draft according to its terms when complete, to
the extent stated in revised sections 3-115, dealing with incomplete
instruments, and 3-407, dealing with alteration. Although this situ-
ation may seem different from the drawer's contract under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2), which makes no reference at all to incom-
plete instruments or alterations, the drawer's contract under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 257-413(2) is subject to present Article 3's rules on
incomplete instruments under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-115 and N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-3-407.11 Indeed, revised Article 3 simply makes
clear by reference to revised sections 3-115 and 3-407 what is gen-
erally the law under the present Article 3.19
The last sentence in revised subsection 3-414(b) states who
can enforce the obligation. According to that section, that person is
"a person entitled to enforce the draft" or "an indorser who paid
the draft under Section 3-415." A quick look at revised section 3-
415, entitled "Obligation of the Indorser," reveals that this in-
dorser is probably the same as "any indorser who takes it up"
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2). The harder question is the
identity of "a person entitled to enforce the draft." Under present
Article 3, a holder ° would obviously be entitled to enforce an in-
strument, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-301 so provides. A look at
the Table of Disposition shows, however, that present Article 3's
section 3-301 has been omitted. Fortunately, the Table of Disposi-
tion includes a comment to "see Comment to 3-301," and that
comment states that revised section 3-301 "replaces former Section
3-301 that stated the rights of a holder."' "4 Indeed, revised section
37. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 2 (1990).
38. Subsection (2) of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-115 (1986) brings in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-407 (1986) when the completion is unauthorized.
39. Revised section 3-115 generally carries forward the rules set out in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-3-115 (1986). See revised § 3-115, Official Comment 1.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(25) (1986).
41. U.C.C. § 3-301, Official Comment (1990).
268 [Vol. 13:259
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3-301 is entitled, "Person Entitled to Enforce Instruments," and it
includes, among three categories of persons who can enforce an in-
strument, "the holder of the instrument. '42 Thus, although "a per-
son entitled to enforce the draft" is broader than N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-413(2)'s holder, it certainly includes the holder as a person
who can sue.
The last sentence of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(2) provides'
that the drawer may disclaim the drawer's liability by drawing
without recourse. Revised subsection 3-414(e) contains this same
rule, but it applies only to drafts that are not checks.43 Without
noting this change in the law, the Official Comment provides as
explanation that "[t]here is no legitimate purpose served by issu-
ing a check on which nobody is liable. '44
Despite the extensive rewriting of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
413(2) by revised Article 3, the major difference for the holder su-
ing on the drawer's contract under revised Article 3's subsection 3-
414(b) is that he does not have to give notice of dishonor or pro-
test, and therefore the drawer of the check can not discharge his
liability because of an untimely notice of dishonor or protest. How-
ever, the discussion so far has taken care of only two out of six
subsections on the drawer's contract in revised section 3-414. The
lawyer in our example should, of course, examine those other sub-
divisions to be sure that they in no way adversely affect the suit on
the drawer's contract.
Revised section 3's first subsection, (a), states the obvious, re-
inforced by the Official Comment,45 that this section does not ap-
ply to a drawer of a cashier's check or other drafts drawn on the
drawer. That obligation is covered by revised Section 3-412.
Two of the remaining three subdivisions bring together provi-
sions which apply to the drawer's contract, but which are scattered
throughout present Article 3. For example, subsection (c) of re-
vised section 3-414 provides for the effect of acceptance on the
drawer's contract, a subject covered presently in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-411(1). As noted by the Official Comment, revised section 3-
414(c) changes the rule in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-411(1) since a
discharge results under N.C. GEN STAT. § 25-3-411(1) only when a
42. U.C.C. § 3-301(i) (1990).
43. U.C.C. § 3-104(f) defines a check as a draft, other than a documentary
draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or a cashier's check or teller's
check.
44. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 5 (1990).
45. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 1 (1990).
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holder procures the certification; under revised section 3-414(c),
the drawer is discharged regardless of by whom acceptance was ob-
tained.46 In addition, revised section 3-414(c) applies to all drafts
and is not limited to checks as is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-411(1).
Subsection (f) of revised section 3-414 actually pulls from two
provisions in present Article 3 and places them together to show
the effect of an untimely presentment on the drawer's contract.
This subdivision takes from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-503(2)(a) a 30
day rule for timely presentment against a drawer of an uncertified
check 41 and puts it together with the effect of an untimely present-
ment from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-502(1)(b) 48 so that a drawer
under revised Article 3 may after 30 days discharge his liability by
an assignment of his rights against the drawee when the drawee
suspends payment after the 30 day period and the drawer is de-
prived of funds as a result. Except for present Article 3's use of the
30 day period for a timely presentment as a presumption on an
uncertified check rather than the hard and fast time period of 30
days for an unaccepted draft under revised Article 3, the difference
between the two articles on this provision is not significant.
Finally, subsection (d) of revised section 3-414 handles the sit-
uation when a draft is accepted and the acceptor is not a bank, a
subject not covered by the present Article 3. 9 In contrast to the
resulting discharge of the drawer's contract under revised subsec-
tion 3-414(c) when acceptance is by a bank, subsection (d) pro-
vides that the drawer's obligation to pay becomes the same as the
obligation of an indorser if the draft is dishonored by the acceptor.
In other words, the drawer's contract in this case is secondary, sub-
ject just like the indorser's contract, to the giving of notice of dis-
honor and discharge if the notice of dishonor is untimely.50
None of these last four subsections really affects the lawyer's
use of the drawer's contract in the suit against the drawer. Indeed,
46. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 3 (1990).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-503(2)(a) (1986). The thirty (30) days rule from
present Article 3 is, however, only a presumption of a reasonable period for pre-
sentment; revised Article 3 does not continue the use of the presumption.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-502(1)(b) (1986).
49. If revised Article 3 contained in its Official Comments a section noting
prior uniform statutory provisions, it would be far easier and quicker to deter-
mine that present Article 3 contains no similar section. The author bases this
statement on his prior knowledge of present Article 3 and a quick look in reverse
(under the column for revised sections) at the Table of Disposition.
50. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 4 (1990).
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even with the conclusion reached above with respect to revised
subsection 3-414(b), the lawyer may correctly conclude that, at
least in a suit against the drawer on the drawer's contract, the revi-
sion of Article 3 makes very little difference. However, any lawyer
knowledgeable about present Article 3 will realize, perhaps pain-
fully, that the revision of Article 3, as extensive as it is, will in the
future claim a significant portion of his time in locating appropri-
ate code sections, reading and studying them, and considering how
any changes may or may not affect his actions in a case involving
negotiable instruments.
III. THE SCOPE OF REVISED ARTICLE 3
Revised subsection 3-102(a) states simply that revised Article
3 applies to Negotiable Instruments, which is not very surprising
since the revised article is entitled "Negotiable Instruments." Con-
trasting the revised article's scope with that of present Article 3,
the Official Comment to revised section 3-102 states that present
Article 3 has no similar provision affirmatively stating its scope.5 1
Indeed, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-103 merely states to what it
does not apply,52 and then N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-104(1) states the
familiar requirements for a writing to be a negotiable instrument,
one of which is that it must contain order or bearer language. Sub-
sequently, in its very last section, present Article 3 sets out one
fairly broad exception to the requirement that a negotiable instru-
ment must contain order5" or bearer 54 language. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-805 provides that article 3 also applies to any instrument
whose terms do not preclude transfer and which is otherwise nego-
tiable within Article 3 except that it is not payable to order or to
bearer. The only difference between a writing within present Arti-
cle 3 by virtue of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805's exception and one
that fully qualifies under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-104(1) is that the
holder of the writing under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 cannot be a
holder in due course. Thus, a writing complying in every way with
N.C GEN. STAT. § 25-3-104(1), except that it is neither payable to
bearer or order, is still within the scope of present Article 3, except
that no holder of it can be a holder in due course.
Revised Article 3 subtly changes the scope of present Article
51. U.C.C. § 3-102, Official Comment 1 (1990).
52. Money, documents of title, and investment securities.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-110 (1986).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-111 (1986).
1991]
13
Lewis: A North Carolina Preview of the Revised (1990) Article 3 of the U
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
3's coverage. Just like present Article 3, revised Article 3 requires
that a negotiable instrument within its scope must contain order or
bearer language, but as the Official Comment to revised section
3-104 explains, ". . .[t]here is no provision in revised Article 3 that
is comparable to former Section 3-805."56 Although revised Article
3 does away with present Article 3's exception by omitting N.C.
GEN..STAT. § 25-3-805, it thereafter provides for an exception of its
own. Revised Article 3's exception, however, is considerably nar-
rower than that of present Article 3.
Revised Article 3's exception is set out conveniently in subsec-
tion (c) of revised section 3-104; it is not relegated to the end of
the article as is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 in the present Article 3.
Revised section 3-104(c) provides that if an order 51 meets all the
requirements for negotiability" except that it is not payable to or-
der or bearer"9 and it falls within the definition of a check,60 then it
is a negotiable instrument. Thus a check remains a negotiable in-
strument even if it is not payable to order or bearer as long as it
otherwise complies with the revised Article 3's requirements of
negotiability.
The significance of this result is that revised Article 3's rules,
including its provisions on holder in due course status, still apply
to such a check. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805, which creates a broad
exception, allows present Article 3 to cover both promises and or-
ders, even if they are not payable to order or bearer, but takes
away the benefits of holder in due course status. In contrast, re-
vised section 3-104(c) creates a narrow exception covering only or-
ders that are checks, even if they are not payable to order or
bearer, but still extending to those checks all the benefits of re-
vised Article 3, including those flowing from holder in due course
status. Of course, any other promise or order that is not payable to
order or bearer is not a negotiable instrument and is thus not cov-
ered by revised Article 3's rules, even if they otherwise meet re-
vised Article 3's requirements of negotiability.
55. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1) (1990).
56. U.C.C. § 3-104, Official Comment 2 (1990). The Table of Disposition con-
firms that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 is omitted and conveniently refers to Official
Comment 2 to revised section 3-104.
57. U.C.C. § 3-103(6) (1990).
58. I.e., it meets the requirements of revised § 3-104(a)(2) and (3).
59. I.e., it fails under revised § 3-104(a)(1) requiring that the order be paya-'
ble to order or bearer.
60. U.C.C. § 3-104(0 (1990).
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The Official Comments to revised section 3-104 set out the
reasons for this change in scope of revised Article 3. Although ac-
knowledging that words making a promise or order payable to or-
der or bearer are the most distinguishing feature of a negotiable
instrument, the comments state that the exception to the rule
carved out for checks by revised section 3-104(c) is based on the
belief that it is good policy to treat checks, which are payment in-
struments, as negotiable instruments whether or not they contain
the words order or bearer. 1 As suggested by the comments, the
absence of order or bearer language can easily be overlooked and
should not therefore affect the rights of holders who may pay
money or give credit for a check without being aware that it is not
in the conventional form.2
Other drafts and all promises are, of course, excluded from
coverage of revised Article 3 if they do not contain order or bearer
language. The Official Comments state that this "total exclusion"
serves a useful purpose by providing a simple device to clearly ex-
clude a writing that does not fit the pattern of typical negotiable
instruments and which is not intended to be a negotiable instru-
ment. 3 If the rule were otherwise, assert the comments, disputes
could conceivably arise over the negotiability of contracts for the
sale of goods or services or for the sale or lease of real property
because they contain a promise to pay money." A strict rule of
total exclusion, except for checks, would therefore preclude any ar-
gument that such contracts might be negotiable instruments.
The North Carolina courts are quite aware of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-3-805. For example, in Old S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. C.,65
a certificate of deposit did not contain the requisite "order or
bearer" language, but it was apparently otherwise a negotiable in-
strument under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-104(1). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals used N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 as a justification
for applying present Article 3's rules in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-
307(1) and (2) relating to the admission of signatures and the re-
covery of a judgment on an instrument. Revised Article 3's rules
would, of course, not apply to the certificate of deposit in this case
because it did not contain order or bearer language and it was not
61. U.C.C. § 3-104, Official Comment 2 (1990).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Old S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. C., 36 N.C. App. 18, 244 S.E.2d 264
(1974).
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a check within the only exception to revised Article 3's rule of total
exclusion.
In First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of New Bern v. Branch Bank-
ing & Trust Co.,66 the North Carolina Supreme Court had before it
a draft drawn by The Hanover Insurance Company on itself and
payable through Chase Manhattan Bank. The court noted that the
draft was not a negotiable instrument because it was payable with-
out the addition of the words "or order" or any similar words of
negotiability. Nevertheless, the court, citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-
3-805, held that present Article 3 applied, except that the holder of
the draft could not be a holder in due course. The court then con-
cluded that the rights of the parties were to be determined as if
the draft were a negotiable instrument and thereafter proceeded to
apply numerous sections from present Article 3. Again, revised Ar-
ticle 3's rules would not apply to the draft in this case because it
did not contain order or bearer language and, although it was a
draft, it was not a check within revised subsection 3-104(f).17
Although it appears that revised Article 3's limited scope
would change the result in the two cases discussed, it is still possi-
ble to argue that revised Article 3 might still allow the results de-
cided by the North Carolina courts. The Official Comments state
that nothing in revised sections 3-104 or 3-102 is intended to mean
that a court could not in a particular case involving a writing simi-
lar to a negotiable instrument treat that writing in a similar man-
ner as if the writing were a negotiable instrument. 8 As an example,
the comments suggest that an obligor might be precluded from as-
serting a defense against a bona fide purchaser based on estoppel
or ordinary principles of contract.0 9 Also, the comments suggest
that the immediate parties to an order or promise that is not an
instrument may provide by agreement that one or more of the pro-
visions of Article 3 determine their rights and obligations."0 Fi-
nally, the comments suggest that a court could apply one or more
66. First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C. 44, 191
S.E.2d 683 (1972).
67. Official Comment 4 to Revised § 3-104 confirms this result by stating,
"[A] draft drawn on an insurance company payable through a bank is not a check
because it is not drawn on a bank." In addition, this draft was payable by Chase
Manhatten not on demand, as is necessary for a check, but upon acceptance by
The Hanover Insurance Company.
68. U.C.C. § 3-104, Official Comment 2 (1990).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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provisions of revised Article 3 to a writing by analogy.71 Certainly,
a good argument could be made based on this last suggestion of
the comments to achieve the same results under revised Article 3
in these two cases as those of the North Carolina courts did under
present Article 3.
IV. THE VARIABLE INTEREST RATE NOTE
When present Article 3 was being drafted, variable rate inter-
est notes were not common, and the drafters probably did not even
consider whether a variable rate interest note should be included
within the scope of present Article 3. Of course, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-104(1)(b) requires that any writing to be negotiable within
present Article 3 must contain a "sum certain," certainly sug-
gesting the possibility that such notes would not be negotiable.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-106 attempts to provide some certainty as
to when a sum payable is a sum certain, but it provides little help
in getting at what a sum certain really is. Fortunately, the Official
Comment to that section does provide the following test for a sum
certain:
"The computation [of the sum certain] must be one which can
be made from the instrument itself without reference to any
outside source, and this section does not make negotiable a note
payable with interest 'at the current rate.' "72 Such a test on its
face would seem to prevent any variable interest rate note from
being negotiable because variable interest rates are usually pegged
to some external standard such as the prime rate or a treasury bill
rate, which are obviously outside sources condemned by the test of
the Official Comment for N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-106.
If double digit inflation had not come to the nation's economy
in the early 1970's and showed some signs of continued fluctuation
in later years, the issue may not have been raised, but the variable
rate interest note became quite common as a result, and the issue
naturally arose as to whether such notes were covered by Article
3's rules on negotiable instruments. Despite some argument to the
contrary, the consensus after several years of legal comment 73 and
71. Id. The Official Comment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 (1986) also sug-
gests that Article 3 might be applied to a non-negotiable instrument by analogy.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-106, Official Comment 1 (1986).
73. See, e.g., Darr, The Negotiability of Variable Interest Notes, 33 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 103 (1988); Dubner, Variable Interest Rates - Their Effect on Nego-
tiability Under the UCC, 93 COM. L. J. 1 (1988); Hiller, Negotiability and Varia-
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litigation " was that such variable interest rate notes could not be
negotiable under present Article 3. In response, demands were
made to amend the UCC to bring variable interest rate notes
within present Article 3,6 and some states went so far as to amend
their own codes to make the variable rate interest notes negotia-
ble. 6 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the most hoped for change
to be brought about by the revised Article 3 is the amendment of
present Article 3's sum certain requirement to include variable rate
interest notes as negotiable instruments.
Revised Article 3 sets out its requirements for negotiability in
the same numbered section, 3-104, as does present Article 3. How-
ever, present Article 3's familiar term "sum certain" is dropped in
the revised Article 3, and in its place is the term "a fixed amount"
followed by the phrase "with or without interest or other charges
described in the promise or order." The Official Comment men-
tions the above language and then makes reference to revised sec-
tion 3-112(b) on interest.78 That revised section, 3-112, is entitled
"Interest,"and in its subsection (b) states that
"Interest may be stated in an instrument as a fixed or varia-
ble amount of money or it may be expressed as a fixed or variable
rate or rates. The amount or rate of interest may be stated or
described in the instrument in any manner and may require refer-
ence to information not contained in the instrument ... .
The obvious intention of the above provision is to bring the
variable rate interest note within revised Article 3. Indeed, the Of-
ficial Comment to section 3-112 states that the term "fixed
amount" in revised section 3-104 applies only to principal;8 0 thus,
ble Interest Rates, 90 COM. L. J. 277 (1985); Comment, The Effect of Variable
Interest Rates on Negotiability, 48 LA. L. REV. 711 (1988); Note, An Argument
for the Alteration of the UCC to Include Variable Rate Notes as Negotiable In-
struments, 9 J. OF LAW AND COMMERCE 115 (1989).
74. See, e.g., Taylor v. Roeder, 234 Va. 99, 360 S.E.2d 191 (1987).
75. See, e.g., Note, supra note 73, at 115; "UCC Update," 75 ABA J. Aug. 20
(1989); Blodgett, "Variable-rate notes & the UCC," 74 ABA J. Aug. 26 (1988);
Report on Article 3 and 4 Revision and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfer
Project, 42 Bus. LAW. 1283, 1287 (1987).
76. See, e.g., New York U.C.C. § 3-106(2)' (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-3-
104(b)(ii) (1990).
77. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990).
78. U.C.C. § 3-414, Official Comment 1 (1990).
79. U.C.C. § 3-112(b), Official Comment (1990).
80. U.C.C. § 3-112, Official Comment 1 (1990).
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the interest of a note need not be a "fixed" amount. In addition,
the same comment states that ". . [i]f a variable rate of interest is
prescribed, the amount of interest is ascertainable by reference to
the formula or index described or referred to in the instrument.8'
V. FTC HOLDER IN DUE COURSE REGULATIONS
In May of 1976, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
Holder in Due Course Regulations became effective. 2 This rule
provides in general that it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice
as defined in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 8 for
a seller, 84 who is in the business of selling goods or services to con-
sumers,8 5 to take a consumer credit contract" or the proceeds of a
purchase money loan8 7 unless the consumer credit contract taken
by the seller or made in connection with the purchase money loan
contains a provision in at least ten point, bold face language pro-
viding that the holder of the consumer credit contract takes sub-
ject to all claims and defenses which the debtor8 could assert
against the seller.8 9
The policy behind these regulations, at least as far as Article
3's negotiable instrument is concerned, is to prevent a consumer
buyer from falling victim to what is known as the holder in due
81. Id.
82. The most recent version of this regulation is 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1990).
83. 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1987).
84. Seller is defined as "A person who, in the ordinary course of business,
sells or leases goods or services to consumers." 16 C.F.R. §433.10) (1990).
85. Consumer is defined as "A natural person who seeks or acquires goods or
services for personal, family, or household use." 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b) (1990).
86. A "consumer credit contract" is defined as "Any instrument which evi-
dences or embodies a debt arising from a 'Purchase Money Loan' transaction or a
'financed sale' as defined in paragraphs (d) and (e)." 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(i) (1990).
Paragraph (d) defines "purchase money loan"; see note 84 infra. Paragraph (e)
defines "financing a sale" as "extending credit to a consumer in connection with a
"Credit Sale" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z."
16 C.F.R. § 433.1(e).
87. Purchase money loan is defined as "A cash advance which is received by
a consumer in return for a 'Finance Charge' within the meaning of the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z, which is applied, in whole or substantial part, to a
purchase of goods or services from a seller who (1) refers consumers to the credi-
tor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract, or business
arrangement." 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1990).
88. I.e., the buyer of the goods or services.
89. 16 C.F.R. §433.2(a),(b) (1990). See also a similar requirement in North
Carolina's Retail Installment Sales Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25 (1986).
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course doctrine. In the classic example of that doctrine at work,
the seller sells goods or services to a consumer and takes in pay-
ment for them a negotiable promissory note0 by which the con-
sumer agrees to pay for the goods in installments over time. The
seller then sells the note to a third party who takes it by proper
negotiation, as well as for value, in good faith, and without notice
that it is overdue, or has been dishonored, or of any defense
against or claim to it."' Unfortunately, the consumer subsequently
discovers some defect in the goods or services. His immediate reac-
tion is to withhold further payment on the promissory note and
assert the defect as a defense when and if the seller sues for the
amount still owed on the note. The seller, of course, received his
money When he sold the note to the third party and is out of the
transaction, leaving the consumer to contend with the third party
who now expects payment. The consumer's refusal to pay the in-
stallments due on the promissory note instigates a suit by the third
party against the consumer for the full amount of the note. When
the consumer asserts in defense the defective goods or services, the
third party claims holder in due course status, entitling him to
take free of the consumer's personal defense of defective goods or
services." The consumer is then forced to pay the full amount of
the note to the third party, and his only recourse is to hire a law-
yer and begin a suit for damages against the seller.
Under the FTC's Holder in Due Course Regulations, the result
is quite different. In order to avoid the sanctions that may be im-
posed by the FTC,9" the seller should add the previously men-
tioned ten point, bold face language, and the third party in the
above example will then take the promissory note subject to the
consumer's defense. In other words, the third party can still sue
the consumer for the full amount of the promissory note, but the
consumer can counterclaim for damages resulting from the defec-
tive goods or services. In short, the FTC's language allows the con-
sumer to assert against the third party the defenses that he has
against the seller, in direct contravention of the UCC's holder in
due course doctrine.94
The effect of the FTC's language has apparently never been in
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-104(1), (2)(d) (1986).
91. Thus becoming a holder in due course. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-302(1)
(1986).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-3-305, 25-3-306 (1986).
93. 15 U.S.C. §45(b),(l),(m) (1987).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305 (1986).
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doubt, but exactly how or why it works has been the subject of
debate." Apparently the most popular view is that the FTC lan-
guage works with state law to make payment of the promissory
note conditional.9 6 in other words, if payment of the promissory
note is indeed subject to claims and defenses of the debtor (con-
sumer) as a result of the FTC language, then payment is certainly
conditional on the assertion of claims and defenses. If payment of
the promissory note is conditional, present Article 3 makes it non-
negotiable. 7 If the promissory note is non-negotiable, then under
present Article 3 the third party can not be a holder in due course
who must take an "instrument," defined under the present Article
3 as a "negotiable instrument,"98 in order to become a holder in
due course. 9 If the third party is not a holder in due course, then
under state law, i.e., the Uniform Commercial Code, he takes sub-
ject to the claims and defenses of the consumer,100 the exact result
expected by the FTC.
Unfortunately, such an explanation, based on the non-negotia-
bility of the promissory note, has other consequences which are not
quite so felicitous.101 If the FTC language does indeed make the
promissory note non-negotiable, the other rules in present Article
3, which apply only to negotiable instruments,102 no longer apply,
and the promissory note, now made non-negotiable and banned
from Article 3 by the FTC language, is then thrown back in with
ordinary contracts and controlled by common law contracts. No
longer is it governed by the certainty that Article 3, and its prede-
cessor, the NIL, gave to negotiable instruments.0 3
It is, of course, questionable whether the FTC intended for the
ten point, bold face language to do far more than just abolish the
effect of the holder in due course doctrine, and there are other the-
ories of how the FTC language could accomplish the abolition of
95. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder
in Due Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How Clever are the Rascals
at the FTC? 68 N.C.L. REV. 953 (1990).
96. Id. at 957; see also WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 3d
ed. § 14-8 (1988).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-3-104(1)(b), 25-3-105 (1986).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 3-102(e) (1986).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-302(1) (1986).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-306 (1986).
101. Sturley, supra note 95.
102. One exception not applicable here is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-805 (1986).
103. For a discussion of the practical consequences of not being able to apply
Article 3, see Sturley, supra n.95, at 958-60.
1991] 279
21
Lewis: A North Carolina Preview of the Revised (1990) Article 3 of the U
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the holder in due course doctrine without taking away the negotia-
bility of the promissory note, 104 but revised Article 3 now puts the
controversy to rest in revised section 3-106, which is entitled, "Un-
conditional Promise or Order." This section expands on revised
Article 3's requirement, carried over from present Article 3, that a
negotiable instrument's promise or order must be unconditional.
Subsection (d) of revised Section 3-106 provides that if a promise
or order contains a statement, required by applicable statutory or
administrative law, to the effect that the rights of a holder or
transferee are subject to claims or defenses that the issuer 0 5 could
assert against the original payee, the promise or order is not by
that' statement made conditional, but there cannot be a holder in
due course of the instrument. Thus, the revised Article 3 retains
control over a promissory note in which the FTC language has
been inserted so that it remains a negotiable instrument, but the
desired effect of the FTC language remains since the holder of
such a promise or order cannot be a holder in due course and take
free of the consumer's personal defenses.
VI. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Present Article 3 has no provision setting out the statute of
limitations for negotiable instruments. It does have N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-122 which provides when a cause of action accrues for
the maker or acceptor on a time or a demand instrument, 10 6 when
it accrues against the obligor of a demand or time certificate of
deposit,10 7 and when it accrues against a drawer of a draft or an
indorser of any instrument. 0 8 Although the Official Comment to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122 confines itself to comments on the
terms of accrual of actions and makes only a passing reference to
the statute of limitations,0 9 the North Carolina Comment specifi-
cally states the connection between N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122 and
the statute of limitations. According to that comment, the terms of
accrual in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122 "are intended to state the
time at which the period of limitations begins to run in favor of the
104. Sturley, supra note 95.
105. I.e., a maker. See U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (1990).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-112(1)(a),(b) (1986).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122(2) (1986).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-112(3) (1986).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122, Official Comment 1 (1986).
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various parties."11 Thus, under Article 3 as it presently exists in
North Carolina, the appropriate period for the statute of limitation
may be determined only by looking to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122
to determine when the cause of action accrues on a particular ne-
gotiable instrument and then by looking to some other section in
the General Statutes for the length of time over which the statute
of limitation runs.1 In short, present Article 3, by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-3-122, states the beginning point for the running of the stat-
ute of limitations, but it does not say how long it runs.
As an example, consider the statute of limitation against the
maker of a negotiable promissory note that is payable on a certain
day, such as April 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122(1)(a) states that a
cause of action against the maker of that note will accrue on the
day after maturity, i.e., April 2. Under present Article 3 then, the
statute of limitations will begin to run on April 2. Some other stat-
ute within the General Statutes must next provide how long the
statute of limitations will run.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(2), one of numerous statutes of limita-
tions in Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, provides a ten year
statute of limitation ". . .[u]pon a sealed instrument against the
principal thereto." To an attorney not versed in the lore of the
ancient seal and its effect on a contract, this provision might not
seem applicable to a promissory note, but a fast look at the anno-
tations following N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122 reveals that it does
indeed apply to a negotiable promissory note under seal. 2 Assum-
ing the note is indeed "under seal," 1 3 then N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122, North Carolina Comment (1986). See also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983) which ties the running of the statute of limitations
to the accrual of the cause of action.
111. Chapter 1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, particularly Article 5,
entitled "Limitations, Other than Real Property," is a good place to begin looking
in this particular case, but every attorney should be warned that statutes of limi-
tation are scattered throughout the General Statutes.
112. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Kalin, 81 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1936);
Sayer v. Henderson, 225 N.C. 642, 35 S.E.2d 875 (1945); Lee v. Chamblee, 223
N.C. 146, 25 S.E.2d 433 (1943); Demai v. Tart, 221 N.C. 106, 19 S.E.2d 130 (1940);
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 44 N.C. App. 261, 261 S.E.2d 145
(1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 741, 267 S.E.2d 661 (1980).
113. Whether an instrument is under seal has been the subject of litigation in
North Carolina. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. C.J. Kern Contractors, Inc., 314 N.C.
423, 334 S.E.2d 63 (1985); Mobile Oil Corp. v. R.E. Wolfe, 297 N.C. 36, 252 S.E.2d
809 (1979); Central Sys. v. General Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 48 N.C. App.
198, 268 S.E.2d 822 (1980), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 445 (1980).
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and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122(1) together indicate that the stat-
ute of limitations on the promissory note as against the maker is
10 years from April 2. If the promissory note is not under seal,
then N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(1) applies, together with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-122, so that the statute of limitations is only three
years against the maker, starting again as of the day after matur-
ity. A seal in North Carolina still makes a large difference!
In revised Article 3, present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122 is
shown on the Table of Disposition as omitted, but there is a nota-
tion to "See Comment 1 to 3-118". That section, 3-118, is entitled,
"Statute of Limitations," and its comment114 begins by stating that
revised section 3-118 differs from former section 3-122 because it
does not define when a cause of action accrues. Accrual of a cause
of action, it reports, is stated in other sections of Article 3, "such
as those that state the various obligations of the parties to an
instrument."' 1 5
If this comment is taken seriously, however, and some of those
sections that "state the various obligations of the parties to an in-
strument," are examined, no specific reference will be found to ac-
crual of actions. For example, revised section 3-412, entitled "Obli-
gation of Issuer of Note or Cashier's Check," merely states that the
issuer of a note is obliged to pay it according to its terms. No sig-
nificant change is made in this revised section from the statement
of the same obligation in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-413(1), and no
specific mention is made of accrual of action as in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-3-122.
Revised section "3-502, entitled "Dishonor," however, probably
answers the question about accrual of an action. It states in sub-
section (a)(3) that the note is dishonored if it is not paid on the
day it becomes payable. 116 Thus, if the note is not paid on April 1,
it is dishonored and the cause of action against the maker obvi-
ously accrues, beginning the next day.
Accrual of a cause of action, however, is no longer central to
the statute of limitations for negotiable instruments under revised
Article 3. In explaining this change, the Comment to revised sec-
tion 3-118 merely states that revised section 3-118 differs from for-
114. U.C.C. § 3-118, Official Comment 1 (1990).
115. Uniform Law Commissioners, "Short Summaries" (1990).
116. Revised subsection 3-503(a)(3) applies only when subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(2) do not apply. Subsection (a)(1) applies if the note is payable on demand,
and subsection (a)(2) applies when the note is payable at or through a bank or the
terms of the note require presentment.
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mer section 3-122, that accrual of a cause of action can be found
elsewhere, and that the purpose of revised section 3-118 is "to de-
fine the time within which an action to enforce an obligation, duty,
or right arising under Article 3 must be commenced. ' 117 These
comments are, of course, a round-about way of saying that revised
Article 3 now has it own, self-contained statute of limitations set
out now in revised section 3-118. Under revised Article 3, the
North Carolina attorney will no longer look outside Chapter 25 of
the General Statutes for the length of time covered by the statute
of limitations. Indeed, revised section 3-118 does the whole job now
by defining, as previously mentioned, "the time within which an
action to enforce an obligation, duty or right arising under Article
3 must be commenced."'1 8
Revised section 3-118 will certainly make some changes in the
statute of limitations of negotiable instruments in North Carolina,
but at least the changes made are now set out clearly within re-
vised Article 3, and only one statute, rather than two, has to be
consulted. For example, an action against a maker on a negotiable
promissory note payable at a definite time, whether it is under seal
or not, must under revised section 3-118 be commenced within six
years after the due date or dates stated in the note. As mentioned
above, under present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-122, the statute of
limitations on the same note-would begin to run the day after ma-
turity and under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(2) would cover the span of
10 years if under seal, but only three years under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-52(1) if it was not under seal. Thus, not only would the statute of
limitations be changed by revised section 3-118, but the seal's ef-
fect on the statute of limitations for negotiable instruments would
also be eliminated." 9
VII. THE FULL PAYMENT CHECK
Most lawyers and certainly even many laypeople are familiar
with the "full payment check"' 20 and the common law rule that
has made its use so popular. A full payment check is loosely de-
scribed as a check marked with some indication that it is tendered
117. U.C.C. § 3-118, Official Comment 1 (1990).
118. U.C.C. § 3-118, Official Comment 1 (1990).
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-113, Official Comment and North Carolina
Comment (1986).
120. This check is also sometimes called a full settlement check or a full sat-
isfaction check.
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in full payment of a disputed claim.12 1 The common law rule, of
course, provides that an accord and satisfaction is established
when a payee cashes the check tendered in full payment of a dis-
puted claim.122 The rule applies even though the payee tries to re-
serve his rights to sue by striking out the full payment language on
the check before he cashes it.123
Present Article 3 says nothing about a full payment check. 124
Article 1 does, however, contain section 1-207, which allows a party
to explicitly reserve his rights (by such words as "without
prejudice" or "under protest") and then to perform in any manner
demanded or offered without prejudicing the rights reserved. Some
courts have interpreted section 1-207 as covering the full payment
check.1 25 Indeed, by the payee's writing "without prejudice" or
"under protest" on the full payment check, those courts have held
that section 1-207 has changed the common law rule so that accord
and satisfaction will not occur, and the payee of the check can then
cash it and still sue for the balance claimed.12 6
Although it appeared briefly that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals might follow this new interpretation of section 1-207 and
thus change the common law rule as it related to the full payment
check,1 27 it has steadfastly refused to hold that section 1-207 of
121. Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 264 S.E.2d 385 (1980).
122. Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 281, comment d (1986).
123. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 564,
302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 353 (1983) (cashing
of check tendered in full payment of a disputed claim established an accord and
satisfaction regardless of an extensive disclaimer placed on the check); Brown v.
Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980) (although de-
fendant put the words "account in full" in the lower left hand corner of the check,
plaintiff struck those words out before he deposited it and even notified the de-
fendant that he was reserving his rights; common law rule was nevertheless ap-
plied to establish accord and satisfaction). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
281, comment d (1986).
124. Article 3 in its drafting stages contained a section, later withdrawn,
which specifically covered full payment checks. See Brown v. Coastal Truckways,
Inc., 44 N.C. App 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfac-
tion: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. J. 48 (1978).
125. See WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 3d ed. § 13-24
and cases cited in that section. See also Rosenthal, supra note 124.
126. See, e.g., Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Brunswick Iron & Steel Co., 66
N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985).127. Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167
S.E.2d 85 (1969).
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present Article 1 applies to the full payment check.128 Thus, the
law of the full payment check in North Carolina is still based on
the common law rule and is therefore reflected in numerous North
Carolina cases.
129
Revised Article 3, unlike present Article 3, does explicitly
cover the full payment check. 30 Entitled "Accord and Satisfaction
by Use of Instrument," revised section 3-311 incorporates the com-
mon law rule of the full payment check with some minor varia-
tions. '3 The policy given for bringing the full payment check
within revised Article 3 is that the common law rule produces a
fair result and that informal dispute resolution by full satisfaction
checks should be encouraged. 32
In brief, revised section 3-311's rule works to discharge a claim
if the person against whom a claim is asserted can prove the four
elements of the rule: (1) that the instrument or an accompanying
written communication contained a conspicuous statement that
the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim, 33 (2)
that the person does in good faith tender an instrument to a claim-
ant as full satisfaction of the claim,'3 " (3) that the amount of the
128. See Sharpe v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 302
S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 353 (1983); Brown v.
Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Barber v.
White, 46 N.C. App 110, 264 S.E.2d 385 (1980). For the contrary view, see WHITE
AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 3d ed. § 13-24 and cases cited in that
section.
129. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips Constr. Co., 261 N.C. 767, 136 S.E.2d 48
(1964); Allgood v. Wilmington Say. and Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E.2d 825
(1955); Moore v. Greene, 237 N.C. 614, 75 S.E.2d 649 (1953); Blanchard v.
Edenton Peanut Co., 182 N.C. 20, 108 S.E. 332 (1921); Rosser v. Bynum, 168 N.C.
413, 84 S.E. 393 (1915); Honig v. Vinson Realty Co., 98 N.C. App. 392, 390 S.E.2d
744 (1990); Snow v. East, 96 N.C. App. 59, 384 S.E.2d 689, disc. rev. denied, 326
N.C. 51, 389 S.E.2d 96 (1990); Moore v. Bobby Dixon Assoc., 91 N.C. App. 64, 370
S.E.2d 445 (1988), cert. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 445 (1988); Sanyo Elec.,
Inc. v. Albright Distrib. Co., 76 N.C. App. 115, 331 S.E.2d 738, disc. rev. denied,
314 N.C. 668, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985); J.F. Wilkerson Contracting Co. v. Sellers
Mfg. Co., 73 N.C. App. 620, 327 S.E.2d 34 (1985); Sharpe v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310
S.E.2d 353 (1983); Moore v. Frazier, 63 N.C. App. 476, 305 S.E.2d 562 (1983).
130. As part of the revision of Article 3, present section 1-207 is amended by
adding to subsection (2) a provision stating that section 1-207 does not apply to
accord and satisfaction.
131. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 3 (1990).
132. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 3 (1990).
133. U.C.C. § 3-311(b) (1990).
134. U.C.C. § 3-311(a)(i) (1990).
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claim is unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, 13 and (4)
that the claimant obtained payment of the instrument.186
Much of revised section 3-311's rule is reflected in North Caro-
lina cases. For example, revised section 3-311's requirement of a
conspicuous statement that the instrument is tendered in full sat-
isfaction of the claim obviously goes to the issue of whether the
parties did indeed agree1 37 to the satisfaction of the claim. If the
statement is "conspicuous," defined in present Article 1 as ". . .so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it,"'3 8 then it ought to have been written in
such a way that it was seen, read and thus presumably agreed to
by the person who cashed the check. Several North Carolina cases
have noted the need for a clear statement of the full payment lan-
guage on the checks.1 39 Other North Carolina cases have been very
concerned with the agreement between the two parties; that con-
cern has generally been reflected in their refusal to find an accord
and satisfaction as a matter of law and the decision to send the
question to the jury.'4 0
135. U.C.C. § 3-311(a)(ii) (1990).
136. U.C.C. § 3-311(a)(iii) (1990). Obviously, the claimant will obtain pay-
ment when the payor bank pays the check, either because the claimant presented
the check for payment to the payor bank or because the claimant initiated bank
collection by taking the check to his local depository bank where he either depos-
ited it or asked for immediate cash, but Official Comment 4 to revised section 3-
311 adds that obtaining acceptance (i.e., certification at the payor bank) is also
considered to be obtaining payment.
137. The "accord" part of "accord and satisfaction" is an agreement. See All-
good v. Wilmington Sav. and Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E.2d 825 (1955);
Moore v. Bobby Dixon Assoc., 91 N.C. App. 64, 370 S.E.2d 445 (1988), cert. de-
nied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 445 (1988); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Albright Distrib.
Co., 76 N.C. App: 115, 331 S.E.2d 738 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 668, 335
S.E.2d 496 (1985).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(10) (1986).
139. See Allgood v. Wilmington Savings and Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88
S.E.2d 825 (1955) (receipt upon which accord and satisfaction was claimed did
not expressly state that the sum received was accepted in full settlement); Rosser
v. Bynum, 168 N.C. 413, 84 S.E. 393 (1915) ("Ibr. to date" not sufficiently definite
or conclusive); Snow v. East, 96 N.C. App. 59, 384 S.E.2d 689 (1989), disc. rev.
denied, 326 N.C. 51, 389 S.E.2d 96 (1990) (it was not clear from words, "In Full
Food, Clothing, etc." that defendant intended check to cover full payment of a
disputed claim). Moore v. Frazier, 63 N.C. App. 476, 305 S.E.2d 562 (1983) (the
meaning- of "For all claims" cannot be ascertained from the instrument itself
which contains no explanatory or qualifying information).
140. See, e.g., Allgood v. Wilmington Sav. and Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88
S.E.2d 825 (1955) (for nonsuit to be sustained on the theory of an accord and
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It is also interesting to note that revised section 3-311's rule
will bring about a discharge even if the full satisfaction language
does not appear on the check itself. As long as the check is accom-
panied by a written communication containing a conspicuous
statement that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of
the claim, the rule will still apply.141 Although the cautious attor-
ney will no doubt use both a full payment check and a letter indi-
cating full payment,142 one recent North Carolina case has held
that the accompanying letter with appropriate language is suffi-
cient,1"" and other older cases seem to back up the decision.144
satisfaction, it must appear from the evidence, as the only reasonable inference
deducible therefrom, that the plaintiff contracted to accept the lesser sum paid
her in settlement of her claim, but evidence did not establish accord and satisfac-
tion as a matter of law); Blanchard v. Edenton Peanut Co., 182 N.C. 20, 108 S.E.
332 (1921) (it is a question of the intent of the parties, as expressed in their acts
and statements at the time, and unless, on the facts in evidence, this intent is so
clear that there could be no disagreement about it among men of fair minds, the
issue must be decided by the jury); Rosser v. Bynum, 168 N.C. 413, 84 S.E. 393
(1915) (question should be referred to jury as to intent); Snow v. East, 96 N.C.
App. 59, 384 S.E. 2d 689 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 51, 389 S.E.2d 96
(1990) (evidence tended to show that the check was full payment only for some
items and not for others); Moore v. Frazier, 63 N.C. App. 476, 305 S.E.2d 562
(1983) (evidence failed to establish an unequivocal intent by either of the parties
to settle plaintiff's claim against defendant); Of course, some North Carolina cases
have indeed ended with a summary judgment. See e.g., Sanyo Electric, Inc. v.
Albright Distrib. Co., 76 N.C. App. 115, 331 S.E.2d 738 (1985), disc. rev. denied,
314 N.C. 668, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985); Sharpe v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
62 N.C. App. 564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d
353 (1983); Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App 454, 261 S.E.2d 266
(1980).
141. U.C.C. § 3-311(b) (1990).
142. J.F. Wilkerson Contracting Co. v. Sellers Mfg. Co., 73 N.C. App. 620,
327 S.E.2d 34 (1985) (voucher accompanying check showed "Final Payment," as
did accompanying letter); Sharpe v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App.
564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 353 (1983)
(proof of loss statement and full payment check).
143. Sanyo Electric, Inc. v. Albright Distrib. Co., 76 N.C. App. 115, 331
S.E.2d 738 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 668, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985). Al-
though the opinion does not make it clear that the accompanying letter, and not
the check, included the "full, final, and complete settlement" language, the copy
of the check, both back and front, in the record on appeal does make it clear.
144. Blanchard v. Edenton Peanut Co., 182 N.C. 20, 108 S.E. 332 (1921) (a
concurring opinion, however, suggests that there is a difference between a check
with "in full" on its face and the mere receipt of the statement of an account and
the use of the check sent with it for the amount of the balance; according to the
concurring opinion, the former works an estoppel absent fraud or misrepresenta-
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Revised section 3-311's rule may add something to North Car-
olina's rule by requiring that the person in good faith tender an
instrument to a claimant as full satisfaction of the claim. Revised
Article 3 defines good faith not only as honesty in fact, the present
definition applied to present Article 3,145 but also as "the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.' 14 The
comment to revised section 3-311 suggests that "fair dealing"
would prevent an unscrupulous insurer taking unfair advantage of
a necessitous claimant by offering a full payment check that is very
small in relation to the extent of the injury and the amount recov-
erable under the policy. 1' 7 It also suggests that "good faith" may
prevent an accord and satisfaction when a business debtor rou-
tinely prints full satisfaction language on its check stocks and uses
them in payment of its debts, whether or not there is any dispute
with the creditor.'" This good faith requirement is obviously
designed to guard against a mechanical application of the rule and
prevent abuse of the rule by claimants.
Revised section 3-311's requirement that the amount of the
claim be unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute fits in with
present North Carolina law. Several cases make the distinction be-
tween liquidated and undisputed claims which are not under the
common law rule and unliquidated and disputed claims that do
come in under the rule." 9 Although N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540 on its
face appears to provide for an accord and satisfaction even in the
absence of a dispute, it has been interpreted to require a dispute or
tion, while the latter does not); Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Powers, 130 N.C. 152
(1902). See also J.F. Wilkerson Contracting Co. v. Sellers Mfg. Co., 73 N.C. App.
620, 327 S.E.2d 34 (1985) (voucher accompanying check, rather than check itself,
showed "Final Payment," as did accompanying letter).
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(19) (1986).
146. U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (1990).
147. U.C.C. § 3-311, Comment 4 (1990).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App 454, 261 S.E.2d
266 (1980) (recognized that the full payment check rule did not apply in the case
of a liquidated claim as found in Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4
N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969)); Sharpe v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 62
N.C. App. 564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 S.E.2d 353
(1983) (court found that a claim on a fire insurance policy was unliquidated and
under the common law rule; the' insurance policy called for the actual cash value
of the dwelling at the time of loss up to a maximum limit, but the actual cash
value could not be resolved by a predetermined mathematical formula, and it was
not agreed to prior to the date of loss).
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unliquidated claim. 180
The common law rule as set out in revised section 3-311 is
subject to two limitations that protect claimants. 151 Interestingly,
those two limitations are themselves subject to one other limitation
that protects the person against who a claim is asserted.1 2
The first of the limitations to the rule applies only to claim-
ants which are organizations, " and it was intended to safeguard
them from inadvertent accord and satisfaction. 54 An organization,
of course, must always rely on its employees or agents to do all of
its work, and that work ranges from complex commercial transac-
tions to cleaning the toilets. Every organization has a potential
problem in seeing that the right work is done by the employees
who are properly trained to do the work. With a full payment
check, the problem is whether it will get to a person who recog-
nizes the significance of additional language such as "full pay-
ment" on a check and who will then take the right action, such as
seeing that the check is returned in order that no discharge will
occur. Naturally, those organizations that regularly receive large
numbers of checks (alm'ost all of which are not full payment
checks) fear that a full payment check will slip through without
being noticed by clerks who are trained only to record the pay-
ment, stamp them for deposit, and send them for collection at a
bank. Even clerks trained to spot full payment language may let
some full payment checks slip by when overwhelmed by a large
number of checks. Some organizations may not even receive their
checks because they provide their customers with an address to a
lock box in control of a bank which automatically records and de-
posits the checks without regard to any full payment language. In
these cases, accord and satisfaction may occur inadvertently, and
the drafters carved out the first of two limitations to the general
rule to avoid an inadvertent discharge under the general rule.
Revised section 3-311(c)'s first limitation provides that if the
organization, as a claimant, can prove two things, then no dis-
charge will occur, even though the person against whom the claim
is asserted can prove the four elements in revised section 3-311(a)
and (b) that will ordinarily bring about a discharge. The first thing
150. See Moore v. Greene, 237 N.C. 614, 75 S.E.2d 649 (1953).
151. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(1), (2) (1990).
152. U.C.C. § 3-311(d) (1990).
153. U.C.C. § 1-201(28) (1990).
154. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 5 (1990).
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an organization must prove is that it sent a conspicuous statement
to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communica-
tions concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered
as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person,
office, or place.1 The second thing that the organization must
prove is that the check or any accompanying communication was
not received by that designated person, office, or place. 156
The theory behind this limitation is that if an organization
designates a person or its personnel in a designated office or at
designated place, it will train them how to handle a full payment
check. Therefore, if the person receiving the statement does com-
ply by sending a full payment check to the appropriate person, of-
fice or place, then the organization is in a position to make a valid
decision whether to accept the check in satisfaction of the debt. If
the organization obtains payment of the check and does not return
it, the claim is then discharged under the rule of section 3-311(a)
and (b) because the organization has obviously made the decision
to accept the full payment check as a satisfaction of the debt.1 57 If,
however, the person against whom the claim is asserted does not
send the check as requested by the statement to the proper person,
office, or place, and the organization can prove that the check or
any accompanying communication was not received by that desig-
nated person, office, or place, then the rule of revised section 3-311
will not apply to discharge the debt.158 In other words, the organi-
zation's failure to receive the full payment check or the accompa-
nying letter in the requested manner means that the organization
was deprived of an opportunity to make a valid decision about ac-
cepting the check in satisfaction of the debt. Therefore, with no
opportunity to make a decision, there can be no accord or agree-
ment, and thus the common law rule should not apply. Any pay-
ment received by the organization from a full payment check in
that case would be inadvertent and should not bring about a
discharge.
An organizational claimant in a recent North Carolina Court
of Appeals case, Sanyo Electric, Inc. v. Albright Distributing
155. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(i) (1990).
156. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(ii) (1990).
157. The organization then cannot make use of the second limitation to the
common law rule discussed in the following text. Revised section 3-311(c)(2)
states that it does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a state-
ment complying with paragraph (1)(i) of revised section 3-311(c).
158. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(i) (1990).
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Co., 159 might possibly have made use of this exception and changed
the result of the case. 60 In affidavits submitted as a result of mo-
tions for summary judgment from both parties, the plaintiff said
she told the defendant to send any payment to a New Jersey ad-
dress and not the regular Chicago, Illinois, address, which was
merely a bank lock box for receipt of payments. The defendant
nevertheless sent a full payment check to the Chicago address, and
the check was deposited in the claimant's account. Naturally, the
defendant asserted that the claim was therefore discharged. The
Court of Appeals granted summary judgment in favor of defend-
ant, commenting that plaintiff did not deny that the bank in Chi-
cago was its agent, nor did it assert that the bank deposited the
check either with or without authority to compromise the claim,
and that the plaintiff ratified the bank's act by not refunding the
money or in any way repudiating the settlement.
The Court of Appeals' suggestion that the claimant in Sanyo
Electric, Inc., could perhaps have prevented the discharge by re-
funding the money forms the basis of revised section 3-311's sec-
ond limitation.'6 ' This limitation, unlike the first, can be used by
individual claimants, as well as an organizational claimants, but it
is, like the first limitation, designed to prevent inadvertent accord
and satisfaction for a claimant. It provides simply that a claimant,
whether an organization or an individual, may prevent a discharge
under the common law rule by proving within 90 days after pay-
ment of the instrument that the claimant tendered repayment of
the amount of the instrument to the person against whom the
claim is asserted.
The theory behind this limitation is that it provides a period
of time after the fact for the claimant to correct an inadvertent
accord and satisfaction."8 2 Not all people know about the full pay-
ment rule, and they frequently find out about it only after they
have cashed a full payment check and talked with an attorney
about suing for the balance. Some people are probably shocked by
the application of the rule because they truly had no idea that they
agreed to a discharge upon cashing a full payment check. In short,
159. 76 N.C. App. 115, 331 S.E.2d 738 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 668,
335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).
160. On the other hand, the person against whom the claim was asserted
might have made use of the limitation on this limitation to keep the organization
from escaping. See discussion in following text and revised section 9-311(d).
161. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2) (1990).
162. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 6 (1990).
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they would argue that there was no accord or agreement on their
part and that a mechanical application of the rule would be unfair.
This limitation obviously reflects the revising drafters' decision
that in such a case no discharge should take place as long as the
claimant tenders repayment of the amount of the check within 90
days to the person against whom the claim is asserted.
If, however, an organization takes the opportunity under the
first limitation to send a notice that any full payment check or ac-
companying communication must be sent to a certain person, of-
fice, or place and actually receives the check through the desig-
nated channels, and then subsequently deposits the check, it
cannot suddenly decide to cancel out the resulting discharge
brought about in depositing the check by merely tendering back
the money within 90 days under the second limitation. The last
sentence of the second limitation provides expressly that it does
not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a statement
complying with the first limitation in (1)(i).163
It is quite certain that this second limitation can be subject to
abuse. While it is obviously designed, as the comment suggests, to
prevent inadvertent accord and satisfaction,"" it appears at first
glance that a claimant could at one moment agree to accept a full
payment check in satisfaction of a claim and then turn around and
refund the money within 90 days of payment to cancel out the
agreement. The limitation of revised section 3-311's subsection (d)
on the two limitations in subsection (c), however, should prevent
this abuse. Revised subsection (c) states specifically that it is sub-
ject to revised subsection (d). Subsection (d) in turn states that a
claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is as-
serted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the
instrument was initiated, the claimant 65 knew that the instrument
was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim. Thus, if the organiza-
tion in subsection (c)(1) or the individual or organization in sub-
section (c)(2) know that the instrument was tendered in full satis-
faction of the claim, then neither limitation will apply and
discharge will result, even if the organization sent the notice but
did not receive the check through proper channels or if the organi-
zation or individual tenders the amount of the check back within
163. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2) (1990).
164. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 6 (1990).
165. Revised section 3-311 adds, "or an agent of the claimant having direct
responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation."
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90 days. 66 The theory here is that if the claimant knows that the
instrument was tendered in full satisfaction and obtains payment,
then an agreement or accord has occurred and discharge should
result, despite the two limitations.
The rule of revised section 3-311 certainly continues in exis-
tence the general common law rule already existing in numerous
North Carolina decisions. It, however, adds balance to the rule by
requiring good faith on the part of the person against whom a
claim is asserted, by preventing inadvertent discharges on the part
of the claimant, and by protecting the person against whom the
claim is asserted by preventing abuse of the rule by claimants after
they agree to the satisfaction. It should fit in fairly well with the
present North Carolina rule and may well provide considerable re-
lief to attorneys who can now find the rule stated in one place and
not scattered among dozens of cases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many other topics in revised Article 3 remain to be discussed.
Indeed, each revised section needs to be analyzed and compared to
the comparable section or sections in present Article 3 in order to
determine the status of the law if revised Article 3 is ever adopted.
In addition, North Carolina case law under present Article 3 needs
to be analyzed in the light of the revision. This Article, however, as
stated earlier, is meant to provide only a preview of the revised
article, and it is hoped that the reader has, from the few topics
discussed, obtained at least a sense of the revision proposed by the
NCCUSL and ALI in revised Article 3.
For lawyers already familiar with present Article 3, it will not
be too difficult to find their way around in revised Article 3. Al-
though many sections are numbered differently and perhaps com-
bined with parts of several other sections, the revised article's ba-
sic organization into six "parts," is very similar to that of present
Article 3, and the catch lines of the revised sections, together with
the Official Comments and Table of Disposition, provide many
helpful guideposts. Of course, having a prior, working knowledge of
present Article 3 is of great advantage because it helps in figuring
out the meaning and intent of revised Article 3. The biggest fear,
even for the lawyer knowledgeable about present Article 3, how-
ever, is that the rewriting of the sections, particularly substituting
166. U.C.C. § 3-311, Official Comment 7 (1990).
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a new term or phrase for an old and familiar one, will in some
unexpected way change the law.
For those lawyers who know their way only hesitatingly
through present Article 3 and who cannot call on their knowledge
of present Article 3 to help in working with the revised Article 3,
the going will be much tougher. Only careful study of the article
itself and the legal literature about it, coupled with continuing le-
gal education seminars, will likely provide much help.
Despite the adverse effects brought about when any area of
the law undergoes a major revision and modernization, revised Ar-
ticle 3, or some revision similar to it, will probably be adopted
eventually here in North Carolina and across the country. Present
Article 3 has no doubt aged and needs revision, and though it
might sound attractive to the practicing bar, patching up present
Article 3 will probably not do the job adequately. Now that the
NCCUSL and the ALl has proposed revised Article 3, it will no
doubt be examined intensely in the coming year, not only in North
Carolina but also, as befits a very important uniform law, in every
state across the nation. Hopefully, no state will reject revised Arti-
cle 3 merely because of its extensive revision of present Article 3.
Instead, each state should carefully examine the provisions of re-
vised Article 3 for their own merit or deficiency and then balance
those against the merits and deficiencies of present Article 3 to
come up with a revised negotiable instruments law, whether it is
the NCCUSL and the ALI's proposed revised Article 3 or some
version of it.
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